

Who uses Tor?

Quién usa Tor?

Creating Tor's first personas

UX Team - Tor Dev Meeting Stockholm 2019



Intro

Human Centred Design and Tor

What we'll cover:

- What are personas?
- Why do we need them?
- How did we make them?
- Persona showcase & workshop
- Room for improvement
- How to collaborate

What are personas?

Empirical and nonempirical

Personas give us a person to connect with, someone who has goals for using the product, **ensuring human centered design.**

opendesignkit.org/methods/personas

Why do we need them?

Real past use-cases

How do personas help us?

By:


- Fostering **empathy**
- Creating a **vision** for who we are designing for
- Helping us understand **mental models**

“Doctor Jung, have you noticed that my daughter seems to be submerged in the same waters as me?” to which he answered: **“Yes, but where you swim, she drowns.”**

How do we create them?

We don't collect data. We collect human stories.

Forming a representative picture of our users



Creating a persona



Decide on the user type (e.g. Privacy Seeker)



Establish their motivation



Select an appropriate location and choose the languages spoken



Write their biography (i.e. who they are, what their background is)

Creating a persona



Set their risk, trust and technical proficiency levels



Set their income and connectivity, and choose their devices




Write their user stories



Extrapolate their pain points

What are user stories?



Our personas

Starting with five







Jelani

The human rights defender

Jelani

Aleisha

Fernanda

Fatima

Alex



Pronouns

He/Him

Role

LGBTQ+ activist

Location

Uganda

Languages

Luganda

English & French

Jelani

The human rights defender

Jelani lives in Kampala, Uganda. He works for a human rights organisation, publishing the stories of LGBTQ+ people who live in fear of their sexuality or gender identity being discovered and the discrimination that follows.

Anonymity is paramount for Jelani and the LGBTQ+ community in Uganda. The government have repeatedly sought extreme penalties for homosexuality, and newspapers have publicly outed members of the LGBTQ+ community in the past – leading to violent and brutal homophobic attacks often perpetrated by the authorities themselves.

Motivation



Jelani wants to minimise his risk of arrest from collating and publishing LGBTQ+ information in his home country.

Pain points



Jelani lacks the technical knowledge to differentiate trustworthy apps from others.



Low bandwidth and unreliable power make it difficult for Jelani to download Tor Browser.



Jelani's ISP blocks public relays, however a default bridge works instead.



Jelani is suspicious of being tracked, even when using Tor Browser.

Risk level

HIGH

Trust level

LOW

Technical proficiency

NOVICE

Income

LOW

Bandwidth

VERY LOW

Censorship

Tor partially blocked

Devices

Android device

Windows computer


Jelani

Aleisha

Fernanda

Fatima

Alex





Aleisha

The privacy looker

Jelani

Aleisha

Fernanda

Fatima

Alex



Aleisha

The privacy seeker

Aleisha's husband knows her phone's passcode and has access to all of her social media accounts, her bank account and tracks her location too. He often demands her phone to check her messages and browsing history, and should he discover anything he does not like he becomes verbally abusive and violent.

Aleisha has learned of Tor Browser from a friend who escaped a similar situation with the help of a women's shelter. She desperately wishes to seek help for herself too, but lives in fear of being discovered. She's suspicious of using their shared laptop and needs to hide her browsing activity on her iPhone instead.

Pronouns

She/Her

Role

Domestic abuse survivor

Location

Russia

Languages

Russian

N/A

Motivation



Aleisha wants to find help and support for her situation without her browsing activity being discovered by her abusive partner.

Pain points



Aleisha is at particularly high risk with each action she takes prior to using Tor Browser.



Russia's censorship of VPNs frustrates her ability to find out more about Tor Browser.



Aleisha would prefer to browse on her phone, but discovers there's no official iOS app.



Public relays are blocked, and Aleisha struggles to enter a bridge manually.



Aleisha has not been able to connect to the Tor Network, and abandons Tor Browser.

Risk level

MODERATE

Trust level

MODERATE

Technical proficiency

NOVICE

Income

LOW

Bandwidth

HIGH

Censorship

Tor completely blocked

Devices

iOS device

Windows computer


Jelani

Aleisha

Fernanda

Fatima

Alex





Fernanda

The feminist activist

Jelani

Aleisha

Fernanda

Fatima

Alex

**Pronouns**

She/Her

Role

Women's rights activist

Location

Colombia

Languages

Spanish

English

Fernanda**The feminist activist**

Fernanda runs a women's collective focused on reproductive rights in Colombia, where abortion is illegal except in extreme circumstances. Fernanda and her colleagues want to build a website with information about abortion access, birth control, and other resources for people seeking reproductive information. However if this website were linked back to them they may be arrested – or worse.

Fernanda has heard that a Tor onion service will not only protect them from being discovered on the server, but will help protect visitors to their website too by requiring that they use the Tor Browser. In fact, Fernanda plans on using Tor Browser for all her web browsing, just to be on the safe side.

Motivation

Fernanda wants to be able to access and publish outreach material on proscribed topics without fear of surveillance and arrest.

Pain points

Setting up an onion service is an intimidating task, and looks complex.



Fernanda is at risk of arrest if her online activism is discovered.

Risk level

MODERATE

Trust level

MODERATE

Technical proficiency

ADVANCED

Income

MODERATE

Bandwidth

AVERAGE

Censorship

Tor unrestricted

Devices

Android device

Windows computer


Jelani

Aleisha

Fernanda

Fatima

Alex





Fatima

The censored user

Jelani

Aleisha

Fernanda

Fatima

Alex



Fatima

The censored user

Internet censorship in Egypt has expanded under the current administration, which has blocked access to hundreds of websites – the majority of which belong to news and media outlets. Moreover journalists, activists and bloggers are at risk of indefinite detention for their investigations and reporting.

This not only makes Fatima's job as a political researcher more difficult, but places her own freedom in danger too. Fatima has used VPNs in the past to bypass censors, however as the state expands its surveillance apparatus she's learned of the risk of being identified despite her VPN use, and that Tor can better protect her anonymity instead.

Motivation



Fatima wants to bypass state censorship in order to conduct her political research, while minimising her risk of discovery and arrest.

Pain points



Heavy censorship makes it difficult to ascertain which tools will work best in Egypt.



Fatima needs to use Gettor to download the Tor Browser Bundle instead.



The Tor Network is blocked, but Fatima is confident she can configure a bridge manually.



Fatima is at high risk even when using Tor owing to the political nature of her research.

Risk level



Trust level



Technical proficiency



Income



Bandwidth



Censorship



Devices




Jelani

Aleisha

Fernanda

Fatima

Alex





Alex

The fearless journalist

Jelani

Aleisha

Fernanda

Fatima

Alex

**Pronouns** They/Them**Role** Journalist**Location** United States**Languages** English N/A**Alex****The fearless journalist**

Alex has recently read reports of leaked Government watchlists of journalists and activists reporting on topics like state surveillance and immigration. Alex has a duty to protect their sources, and takes the risk of their identification very seriously.

Alex already uses Signal to communicate with their sources and Onion Share to securely receive files and other information. On top of this they've learned about Tor Browser at a recent security workshop, and plan on using it for all work-related activities. However Alex continues to use a less secure browser for leisurely browsing, and as a consequence need to adapt their behaviour as they move between each.

Motivation

Alex wants to be able to browse, chat and receive leaks securely without compromising their sources.

Pain points

Alex is nervous about recent reports of Government "lists" of journalists and activists.



Alex splits their browsing activity across two browsers, each requiring different practices.



Captcha validation makes their browsing painful and annoying.

Risk level   LOW**Trust level**   HIGH**Technical proficiency**   ADVANCED**Income**   HIGH**Bandwidth**     VERY HIGH**Censorship** Tor unrestricted**Devices** iOS device MacBook


Jelani

Aleisha

Fernanda

Fatima

Alex



Coming up next

What can we do better?



EU Region



South & West Asia




East Asia



Greater inclusivity
(e.g. for accessibility)



Incorporating more
metrics data



Including OONI

How to collaborate

First step: visit Trac ticket #30430

¡Gracias!

Questions?